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CRIMINAL ALIENS GET PINCHED: SANDOVAL v. RENO, AEDPA'S
AND IIRIRA'S EFFECT ON HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, the 104th Congress passed two immigration reform laws that
made sweeping changes in immigration law, particularly regarding judicial
review of deportation orders.1 One year after the Oklahoma City bombing, President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") 2 into law. 3 Shortly thereafter, the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA"), 4 which contains both "transitional rules" and "permanent
rules," was passed into law. 5 These two laws were enacted after some of
1. See Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 227 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that Congress passed two bills that made sweeping changes in field of immigration); Lenni
B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to JudicialReview of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1411, 1445 (1997) (noting that IIRIRA made
sweeping changes to judicial review);-Sara A. Martin, Note, Postcardsfrom the Border:
A Result-Oriented Analysis of Immigration Reform Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA, 19 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 683, 683 (1999) (noting that "[t]he adjectives 'Orwellian,'
'Kafkaesque,' and 'draconian' have been used to describe two new immigration
reform laws passed by Congress in 1996" (citing Bill Maxwell, Enter Here, and Abandon Basic Rights, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at ID; Mike Swift, Immigrants
Rushing to Citizenship, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 2, 1997, at Al)); Trevor Morrison,
Note, Removed from the Constitution?DeportableAliens'Access to Habeas Corpus Under the
New Immigration Legislation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 697, 697 (1997) (noting
that Congress passed two statutes in 1996 affecting immigration laws); Ben L. Kaufman, IRS Mistook Bad Books for Bad Motives, CIN. ENQUIRER, July 25, 1999, at C6
(noting that these acts "limit[ ] judicial intervention in the Immigration & Naturalization Service ("INS"), which reports to the attorney general"); Neil A. Lewis, With
ImmigrationLaw in Effect, Battles Go On, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1997, at A4 (noting that
new laws make it difficult for immigrants); Henry Weinstein, Californiaand the West
Court Backs Immigrants in Deportation Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1998, at A3 (stating
that "Congress attempted, among other things, to dramatically restrict the ability
of federal courts to review actions by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service").
2. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending scattered sections of

8 U.S.C.). Some of these provisions, especially the ones regarding judicial review
of criminal aliens, do not relate to anti-terrorism or the death penalty.
3. See Martin, supra note 1, at 684 (stating that "[o]n the one-year anniversary
of the Oklahoma City bombing, President Clinton signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulations in the Immigration
Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Non-Citizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833, 839
(1997) (noting passage of AEDPA); Robert Plotkin, FirstAmendment Challenges to the
Membership andAdvocacy Provisionsof the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 623, 625 (1996) (same).
4. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
5. For a discussion of the "transitional rules" and the "permanent rules," see
infra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.

(711)
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the worst acts of terrorism directed towards American citizens in the
United States history. 6 According to some commentators, these two laws
reflect a continual hostility towards immigrants and may have been en7
acted to "quench" some of the existing anti-immigrant sentiment.
Before the enactment of AEDPA and IIRIRA, non-citizens who were
subject to a final order of deportation, including "criminal aliens,"8 had a
long- standing right to seek judicial review of that decision by appealing to
the courts of appeals.9 Additionally, and more important, aliens (criminal
and non-criminal alike) could seek judicial review of deportation or exclusion decisions issued from the executive branch by filing a writ of habeas
corpus in the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.10 Habeas corpus has
6. See Colleen Caden, Note, Mojica v. Reno: Upholding District Courts' Statutory
Habeas Power Under the Immigration Laws of 1996, 7J.L. & POL'v 169, 169-70 (1998)

(stating that during 1990s, Americans experienced some of worst incidents of terrorism on domestic soil and that AEDPA and IIRIRA were enacted to wage war
against future acts). These acts include the World Trade Center bombing of 1993
that killed six and injured 1042, the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred D.
Murrah Federal Building that killed 168 and injured hundreds more, and the 1996
Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta that killed one and injured 111 people. See id. at
169 n.I (citing bombings); see also Christopher John Farley, America's Bomb Culture,
TIME, May 8, 1995, at 56 (providing numbers of deaths and injuries resulting from
bombings in 1993); Kevin Sack, Officials Show Bomb Parts in Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1997, at A6 (summarizing bombings in Atlanta); Jo Thomas, After EmotionalAppeals, Bomb Jury Weights Penalty, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 1998, at Al0 (describing
emotional impact of Oklahoma bombing).
7. See Linda Kelly, The FantasticAdventures of Supermom and the Alien: Educating
Immigration Policy on the Facts of Life, 31 CONN. L. Rv. 1045, 1071 n.140 (1999)
(stating that "[w]hile more recent legislation has softened some of the harsher
effects of these pieces of legislation, other proposals and federal and state action
reflect a continuing hostility toward immigrants"); Melinda Smith, Comment,
CriminalDefense Attorneys and Noncitizen Clients: UnderstandingImmigrants,Basic Immigration Law & How Recent Changes in Those Laws May Affect Your Criminal Cases, 33
AKRON L. REv. 163, 163-64 (1999) (contending that "[i]t may have been a desire to
quench some of that anti-immigrant sentiment which motivated the 104th Congress to enact the extremely harsh provisions of the [AEDPA] and the [IIRIRA]");
see alsoJason H. Ehrenberg, Note, A Callfor Reform of Recent Immigration Legislation,
32 U. MIcH.J.L. REF. 195, 195 (1998) (stating that AEDPA and IIRIRA "were aimed
at alleviating negative public response to America's growing population of illegal
immigrants").
8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (C) (Supp. 11 1996) (stating that criminal aliens
are persons who have "committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a) (2)
or 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of [Title 8], or any offense covered by
section 1227(a) (2) (A) (ii) of [Title 8] for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section
1227(a) (2) (A) (i) of [Title 8]").
9. See Michelle Slayton, Comment, Interim Decision No. 3333: The Brief Casual,
and Innocent Conundrum, 33 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1029, 1049 (1999)

(stating that

aliens subject to final orders of deportation have been able to file appeals in federal courts to seek judicial review of those orders).
10. See Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting prior to
enactment of AEDPA, § 106(a) (10) of Immigration and Nationality Act provided
for review of deportation order by allowing petitions for habeas corpus); see also
Morrison, supra note 1, at 698 (stating that habeas corpus has long been used by
aliens to seek judicial review of federal executive branch decisions to deport aliens
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been considered a "high prerogative writ ... the great object of which is
the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause.""
Congress, however, abrogated most of these rights by passing the AEDPA
and IIRIRA, which, if read literally, may deprive criminal aliens of all judicial review of deportation orders, thereby creating unprecedented limitations on the availability ofjudicial review and habeas corpus.' 2 These two
congressional jurisdiction-stripping statutes are considered "the most significant limitations on federal jurisdiction since those enacted in connection with World War II price controls and draft legislation."' 3 Therefore,
the breadth of these two acts is an important issue, one that has plagued
4
the various courts of appeals.'
from United States). When the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
brings deportation proceedings, the alien appears before an Immigration Judge
("U"), an administrative law judge under the Department ofJustice. See id. (noting
procedure). Aliens can then appeal decisions of the IJ to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), which is also included in the federal executive branch. See
id. at 698 n.8 (noting immigration structure under federal executive branch).
11. ExparteWatkings, 28 U.S. (6 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.).
12. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 961, 961 (1998) ("The 104th Congress, in its impatience
with the enforcement inefficiencies of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
enacted two statutes that, if taken literally, create unprecedented restrictions on
the availability of habeas corpus to aliens being removed from the United States.");
Morrison, supra note 1, at 697 (noting severity of two new statutes that may remove
all judicial review of deportation orders by administrative agencies); see also Benson, supranote 1, at 1445 (noting that "the new provision limits the availability of
the petition for review for people in disfavored groups or for people presenting
disfavored claims"); Stephan 0. Kline, JudicialIndependence: Rebuffing Congressional
Attacks on the Third Branch, 87 Ky. L.J. 679, 730 (1999) (stating "[a] major threat to
the independence of the federal judiciary, this group of bills [including AEDPA
and IIRIRA] diminished the power of the courts to curtail legislative and executive
actions that violate the Constitution"); Darryl Van Duch, ABA Goes Over Head of INS
on DetaineeIssue - ABA Says INS Refuses to Give Pro Bono Lawyers Access to Some Detainees, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 15, 1999, at A7 (stating that tough new law, IIRIRA, repealed
judicial review of INS decisions in most cases); Ehrenberg, supra note 7, at 195
(AEDPA and IIRIRA dramatically limit procedural rights of criminal aliens);
Smith, supra note 7, at 164 (noting that AEDPA and IIRIRA "narrow the scope of
the traditional constitutional rights of legal resident aliens to an unprecedented
low").
13. Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the
Federal Courts-Opposition,Agreement, and Hierarchy,86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2446 (1998).
See Weinstein, supra note 1, at A3 (noting that "[o]pponents of the bill contended
that it was a radical 'court stripping' measure").
14. See Suspension and Supremacy, Jurisdiction and Judicial Power: Habeas Corpus
After AEDPA and IIRIRA, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 695, 695 (1998) (noting disagreement
among courts).
All courts agree that AEDPA places greater limits upon the occasions
when a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus as post-conviction
relief from a state courtjudgment found to violate federal law. But courts
disagree on just how restrictive these new limits are. It is also uncertain
whether IIRIRA, in conjunction with AEDPA, bars all federal court review
of certain deportation and removal decisions of the [INS], including
habeas review of this most common form of executive detention.
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16
15
In a flurry of recent cases, including Liang v. INS, Sandoval v. Reno,
Catney v. INS1 7 and DeSousa v. Reno, 18 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has considered the effect of the AEDPA and IIRIRA
on criminal aliens. The Third Circuit primarily addressed the applicability
of the new immigration statutes on habeas corpus jurisdiction in Sandoval
and Liang.19 In Sandova the court held that though direct review of criminal aliens' deportation orders did not survive the judicial review limitations of AEDPA and both the "transitional" and "permanent" rules of
IIRIRA, habeas corpus jurisdiction in the district courts still remained intact following the "transitional" rules. 20 Catney and DeSousa both reinforced and expanded on Sandovals holding. 2 1 Although it appears that
the district courts in the Third Circuit retain habeas corpus jurisdiction
following the "transitional" rules, the various district courts are at odds
with each other on this issue. 2 2 Furthermore, in Liang, the Third Circuit

Id. Furthermore, "[n]o issue has been more studiously avoided by the courts, and
more assiduously studied by law professors, than congressional control over the
jurisdiction of the federal courts." David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas
Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress's Control of FederalJurisdiction,86 GEO.
L.J. 2481, 2481 (1998).
15. 206 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2000).
16. 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999).
17. 178 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 1999).
18. 190 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1999).
19. See Liang, 206 F.3d at 310 (discussing applicability of new immigration
statutes to criminal aliens); Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 227 (same). Prior to Liang and
Sandoval, Morel v. INS was one of the first cases to tackle the interpretation of the
AEDPA. Morel concluded that the courts of appeals no longer have jurisdiction to
review a claim of legal error by a criminal alien in a deportation proceeding. See
Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that "[i]n the case of
aliens convicted of certain criminal offenses, AEDPA § 440(a) removes from [the
courts of appeals] jurisdiction to review a claim of legal error in deportation proceedings"). The Morel court also noted that the subsequent adoption of IIRIRA,
which further restructured the deportation process, did not affect the outcome of
the case. See id. at 251. Furthermore, the Third Circuit in Catney held that, "following the passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA, [the court] no longer [has] jurisdiction to
review a denial of discretionary relief to a criminal alien." Catney, 178 F.3d at 195
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c)(2)(C) (Supp. I 1996)); accord More4 144 F.3d at 252).
20. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 231-38 (concluding habeas jurisdiction survived,
while direct review of certain orders did not); see also Catney, 178 F.3d at 195 (stating Sandoval concluded that habeas corpus jurisdiction survived 1996 acts' limitations on judicial review of criminal aliens' deportation orders, but direct review was
repealed).
21. For a discussion of the holdings of these cases, see infra notes 162-73 and
accompanying text.
22. Compare Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 406 (D.N.J. 1999) (finding that "[tlhis court accompanies other courts of this circuit in their determination that district courts retain habeas corpus jurisdiction consonant with the 1996
amendments"), with Jacques v. Reno, 73 F. Supp. 2d 477, 481 (M.D. Pa. 1999)
(holding that "the provisions of IIRIRA which bar judicial review prevent the assertion of habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 as well").
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recently held that habeas corpus jurisdiction
still remains in the district
23
courts despite TIRIRA's "permanent" rules.
This Casebrief focuses on the Third Circuit's interpretation of
AEDPA's and IIRIRA's restrictions on criminal aliens' judicial review of
final orders of deportation and their affect on habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Part II discusses judicial review prior and subsequent to the passage of
AEDPA and IIRIRA. 24 Part II also discusses the various courts of appeals'
interpretation of these two acts. 25 Part III analyzes the Third Circuit's interpretation of the restrictions set by AEDPA and both the "transitional"
and "permanent" rules of IIRIRA, on a criminal alien's right to judicial
review of a final deportation order and its affect on habeas corpus jurisdiction. 2 6 Finally, Part IV summarizes the principal arguments made in cases
under the AEDPA and IIRIRA and discusses the implications of the Third
27
Circuit's decisions.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Habeas Corpus JurisdictionBefore and After the AEDPA and IIR!RA

1. Judicial Review Before the AEDPA and IIRIRA
28
Before Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") in 1961, criminal aliens were entitled to challenge deportation
orders through habeas corpus proceedings in the district courts. 29 When
Congress did amend the INA, it provided that petitions for review by the
court of appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial
review of all final orders of deportations." 30 Despite this language, Congress also enacted INA section 106(a)(10) which stated that "any alien
held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial

23. See Liang,206 F.3d at 322 (holding that statutes did not eliminate habeas
jurisdiction).
24. For a discussion of judicial review before and after AEDPA and IIRIRA,
see infra notes 28-54 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the interpretation of these acts by other courts of appeals, see infra notes 55-117 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of AEDPA and
IIRIRA, see infra notes 118-205 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of a possible outcome regarding criminal aliens' right to
habeas corpus review, see infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.

28. INA of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
29. See Andrea Lovell, Comment, The Proper Scope of Habeas Corpus Review in
Civil Removal Proceedings,73 WAsH. L. REv. 459, 467-69 (1998) (noting that habeas

corpus review was available before 1961). For a further discussion of habeas
corpus before the 1961 INA amendment, see infra notes 141-52 and accompanying
text.

30. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 87-301
§ 5(a), 75 Stat. 651, repealed by IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b), 110
Stat. 3009-612.
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review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings." 31 This INA section did not
create a new right of habeas corpus jurisdiction, rather it was inserted to
both preserve the right and to prevent a potential constitutional challenge
if the "sole and exclusive" language of the INA precluded habeas corpus
32
review.
2.

Judicial Review Under the AEDPA

In 1996, the AEDPA altered and severely limited judicial review for
criminal aliens convicted of certain enumerated crimes.33 First, AEDPA
section 401(e) struck former INA section 106(a)(10) and was entitled
"Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus." 34 Furthermore,
AEDPA section 440(a) was enacted and included the following language:
"Any final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed [certain enumerated criminal offenses] shall not
be subject to review by any court."3 5 These amendments had two effects
on criminal aliens: (1) they eliminated the INA's habeas corpus provision;
31. INA § 106(a) (10), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (10) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No.
87-301 § 5(a), 75 Stat. 651, repealed by IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612.
32. See Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that habeas
jurisdiction was not destroyed by 1961 Act and that legislative history makes clear
that provision 106(a) (10) was added to prevent 'sole and exclusive' language of
106(a) from being read to deprive courts of habeas jurisdiction, thereby creating
constitutional problems); see also Lovell, supra note 29, at 470 (noting that INA
expressly preserved habeas corpus jurisdiction to avoid constitutional problems).
The House Report states:
The section clearly specifies that the right to habeas corpus is preserved
to an alien in custody under a deportation order. In that fashion, it excepts habeas corpus from the language which elsewhere declares that the
procedure prescribed for judicial review in circuit courts shall be exclusive. The section in no way disturbs the Habeas Corpus Act in respect to
the courts which may issue writs of habeas corpus: aliens are not limited
to courts of appeals in seeking habeas corpus.
H.R. REP. No. 87-1086, at 29 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2973.
Furthermore, the Congressional Record stated:
Nothing contained in the bill is, or can be, designed to protect an alien
from obtaining review [of a deportation order] by habeas corpus ....
[W]e were very much concerned over the possibility of writing an unconstitutional statute by depriving even an alien the right to a writ of habeas
corpus.
87 CONG. Rc. H12, 176-77 (1961) (statement of Rep. Walter).
33. See Lovell, supra note 29, at 470 (noting that AEDPA limited judicial review for criminal aliens who were convicted of certain enumerated crimes"); Morrison, supra note 1, at 702 (stating that AEDPA "works a significant withdrawal of
access to habeas corpus for certain deportable aliens").

34. AEDPA of 1996 §401(e),

110 Stat. 1214, 1268 (repealing INA

§ 106(a) (10), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (10) (1994)), repealed by IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-208, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612.
35. AEDPA of 1996 § 440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276 (amending INA
§ 106(a) (10), 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(10) (1994)), repealed by IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-208, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612.
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and (2) they denied judicial review to these aliens.3 6 There is dispute,
however, concerning whether these sections eliminated an alien's right to
habeas corpus review under § 2241.31
3.

Judicial Review After the IIRIRA

Several months after the AEDPA was passed, Congress enacted the
IIRIRA which provides a more in-depth revision of the INA.3 8 This alteration of the judicial review structure for criminal aliens created two sets of
rules: the "transitional rules" and the "permanent rules."3 9 The transitional rules are for criminal aliens who were involved in removal proceedings that commenced before April 1, 1997.40 The permanent rules are
applicable where the removal proceedings commenced on or after April 1,
1997.41
The transitional and permanent rules of the IIRIRA continue to uphold the ban on judicial review of deportation decisions, previously established by AEDPA, for criminal aliens.4 2 IIRIRA, however, adds further
36. See Cole, supra note 14, at 2487 (stating that AEDPA repealed INA provision allowing aliens in custody to seek habeas review of deportation orders);
Lovell, supranote 29, at 470 (noting that AEDPA repealed habeas corpus provision
in INA).
37. For a discussion of the various courts' of appeals interpretations, see infra
notes 57-117 and accompanying text.
38. See Cole, supra note 14, at 2487 (stating that IIRIRA created "a much more
comprehensive revision of the immigration laws"); Lovell, supra note 29, at 470
(noting that by completely repealing INA section 106, IIRIRA further revised
INA).
39. See Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 309,
110 Stat. 3009-625 to -627 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.);
see also Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that IIRIRA
contained both "transitional rules" and "permanent rules"). Both the transitional
and permanent rules were clarified by technical amendments. See Pub. L. No. 104302, § 2, 110 Stat. 3656, 3657 (1997).
40. See generally DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 180-81 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
that appellant was subject to transitional rules because deportation proceedings
commenced before April 1, 1997); Catney v. INS, 178 F.3d 190, 192 (3d Cir. 1999)
(noting that deportation proceedings commenced against appellant in 1992, making transitional rules applicable).
41. See Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 309,
110 Stat. 3009-625-27; see also Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 229 (noting effective dates of
transitional rules and permanent rules).
42. See Cole, supra note 14, at 2487 (stating that IIRIRA continued ban on
judicial review of deportation orders). The transitional rule states:
[T] here shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense
covered in section 212(a)(2) or section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or
(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as in effect as of the date of
the enactment of this Act), or any offense covered by section
241 (a) (2) (A) (ii) of such Act (as in effect on such date) for which both
predicate offenses are, without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 241 (a) (2) (A) (I) of such Act (as so in effect).
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 309(c) (4) (G),
110 Stat. 3009-626. "By congressional directive, the transitional rules are not part
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restrictions on criminal aliens. 43 These restrictions hit criminal aliens the

hardest "because they are apparently denied any judicial review of detention or removal decisions."

44

On one hand, one of the transitional rules, IIRIRA section
309(c) (4) (G), provides: "[T]here shall be no appeal permitted in the case
of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense [enumerated in this section.]" 45 Also, during this
transition period, AEDPA section 440(a) is still applicable. 46 Furthermore, IIRIRA amended INA section 242(g) to state:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
47
alien under this Chapter.
This rule is applied retroactively, making it applicable to both the
transitional and permanent rules. 48 The restriction on judicial review,
however, has been interpreted narrowly by the United States Supreme
of the INA and are not codified in the United States Code." Sandoval, 166 F.3d at
229 n.3. On the other hand, the permanent rule provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section
1182(a)(2) or 1227(a) (2)(A) (iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title, or any
offense covered by section 1227(a) (2) (A) (ii) of this title for which both
predicate offenses are, without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 1227(a) (2) (A) (i) of this title.
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 306(a)(2), 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (C) (Supp. 11 1996).
43. See, e.g., IIRIRA of 1996 § 303(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (Supp. 11 1996) (denying judicial review). These new laws deny judicial review of decisions to detain
criminal aliens pending removal. See id. This provision provides that:
The Attorney General's discretionaryjudgment regarding the application
of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any
action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding
the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of
bond or parole.
Id.

44. Cole, supra note 14, at. 2507. The author notes, however, that while the
INS may make thousands of decisions each year that will be immune from all judicial review because of the AEDPA and IIRIRA, these decisions should be read in
such a manner that aliens (including criminal aliens) are entitled to a broad form
of habeas corpus. See id. at 2504.
45. IIRIRA of 1996 § 309(c) (4) (G), 110 Stat. 3009-626 to -627.
46. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 229 n.1 (noting applicability of AEDPA

§ 440(a)).
47.
ing INA
48.
statute).

IIRIRA of 1996 § 306(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (Supp. 11 1996) (amend§ 24 2(g)).
See IIRIRA of 1996 § 306(c) (1), 110 Stat. 3009-612 (noting retroactivity of
This provision states that:
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Court in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee49 (AmericanArab). The Court said this rule is to be applied only in three discrete ac50
tions listed in the rule and not to the "universe of deportation claims."
Therefore, final orders of removal are not covered by this section.
On the other hand, one of the permanent rules amended by IIRIRA,
INA section 242(b) (9), provides that: 'Judicial review of all questions of
law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional
and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding
brought to remove an alien ... shall be available only in judicial review of
[T]he amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) [that contain the
permanent rules for judicial review shall apply as provided under section
309, except that] subsection (g) of section 242 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (as added by subsection (a)), shall apply without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings under such Act.
Id.
49. 525 U.S. 471 (1999). The issue in this case was whether jurisdiction to
review selective enforcement of the immigration laws by the Attorney General was
repealed by INA section 24 2(g). See id. at 474 (noting issue). The Court held that
section 242(g) deprived the courts of jurisdiction to hear the respondents claim.
See id. at 492 (vacating judgment of United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth
Circuit). Although the Court noted that there was a circuit split regarding the
issue of whether habeas corpus review is available after IIRIRA, it did not resolve
the issue. See id. at 480 n.7 (noting disagreement among various courts of
appeals).
50. See id. at 482 (stating that section 24 2(g) is not "zipper" clause, but is
much narrower). The Third Circuit has interpreted this case by stating that INA
section 242(g) "only applies to suits challenging the government's selective enforcement of the immigration laws." DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir.
1999).
One treatise cited by the United States Supreme Court states:
To ameliorate a harsh and unjust outcome, the INS may decline to institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final
order of deportation. This commendable exercise in administrative discretion, developed without express statutory authorization, originally was
known as nonpriority and is now designated deferred action. A case may
be selected for deferred action treatment at any stage of the administrative process.
6 C. GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 72.03[2] [h] (1998). The
INS discretion over deportation, however, opened up the door to potential litigation where the INS does not exercise its discretion:
[I]n each such instance, the determination to withhold or terminate deEfforts to chalportation is confined to administrative discretion ....
lenge the refusal to exercise such discretion on behalf of specific aliens
sometimes have been favorably considered by the courts, upon contentions that there was selective prosecution in violation of equal protection
or due process, such as improper reliance on political considerations, on
racial, religious, or nationality discriminations, on arbitrary or unconstitutional criteria, or on other grounds constituting abuse of discretion.
Id. at § 72.03[2] [a] (footnotes omitted). Because of the increase in litigation, the
Supreme Court noted INA section 242(g) provides that if the INS's three acts of
discretion are reviewable at all, they will not create separate rounds of judicial
intervention. See American-Arab, 525 U.S. at 485 (noting purpose of INA section
24 2(g)).
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a final order under this section." 5 1 Another one of the permanent rules,
however, excludes criminal aliens from the judicial review that INA section
242(b) (9) affords. INA section 242(a) (2) (C) states that: "Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any
final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense [enumerated in this section]."52 This
provision is severe because it precludes criminal aliens from obtaining judicial review of final orders of deportation and does not affirmatively provide them with an alternative. 53 While the meaning of the transitional and
permanent rules seems similar, the difference between them has been another source of controversy between the courts of appeals in deciding
54
whether habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district courts.
B.

Recent Circuit Responses to the 1996 Acts

Enactment of the AEDPA in 1996 created confusion in the courts of
appeals.5 5 Although the circuit courts basically agree on the breadth and
scope of the judicial review limitations imposed by these acts, 56 they disagree whether § 2241 habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district
courts.

1.

57

Circuit Holding That Habeas CorpusJurisdictionRemains Under the
TransitionalRules

Many of the courts of appeals have held that habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district courts after the enactment of the two statutes.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, 58 before and af51. IIRIRA of 1996 § 306(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (Supp. II 1996)
(amending INA section 242(b) (9)).
52. IIRIRA of 1996 § 306(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 11 1996)
(amending INA section 242 (a) (2) (C)).
53. See id. (noting exclusion of criminal aliens).
54. CompareMax-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194, 202-03 (5th Cir. 2000), petition
for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 23, 2000) (No. 00-6280) (noting that § 2241 habeas corpus
jurisdiction does not remain under permanent rules), with Requena-Rodriguez v.
Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in district courts under transitional rules).
55. See Lovell, supra note 29, at 460 (noting various holdings among courts of
appeals and district courts); Martin, supra note 1, at 702 (noting difference among
courts of appeals).
56. See generally Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 125-26 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that each circuit court has held they no longer may entertain petitions for
review filed by criminal aliens).
57. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 480
n.7 (1999) (noting circuit split). The scope of habeas corpus that remains available is an entirely separate issue which is too broad for the scope of this article. For
a discussion of that issue, see Cole, supra note 14, at 2494-2506.
58. See Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S.Ct. 1529 (2000) (holding that § 2241 habeas corpus jurisdiction was re-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss4/5

10

Droskoski: Criminal Aliens Get Pinched: Sandoval v. Reno, AEDPA's and IIRIRA

2000]

CASEBRIEF

ter American-Arab, have held that, under the transitional rules, habeas jurisdiction remains in the district courts. 59 These circuits agree on two basic
points-that Congress has the constitutional authority to withdraw jurisdiction over petitions for review under the repealed INA section 106, but
that some type of habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district
courts. 60 Furthermore, these circuits use similar rationales in upholding
61
habeas corpus jurisdiction.
First and foremost, the United States Supreme Court decision in the
various courts of appeals cite to Felker v. Turpin62 for the proposition that
habeas corpus jurisdiction was not repealed. 63 In that case, AEDPA section 106(b) directed that state inmates wanting to file "second or successive" habeas corpus petitions must get permission from the court of
appeals, and that a grant or denial of that request "shall not be appealable
64
Statand shall not be the subject of a petition for ... writ of certiorari."
ing that there was no mention of original habeas jurisdiction in the rule,
the United States Supreme Court, relying on Ex parte Yerger,65 held that
because there was no express mention of habeas corpus jurisdiction, and
pealed). The Eleventh Circuit, however, found that under the permanent rules,
§ 2241 habeas corpus jurisdiction does not remain. See id.
59. See Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
habeas corpus jurisdiction continues to exist after American-Arab); Pak v. Reno, 196
F.3d 666, 673 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); Bowrin v. INS, 194 F.3d 483, 489 (4th Cir.
1999) (holding that habeas corpus jurisdiction remains under transitional rules);
Wallace v. Reno, 194 F.3d 279, 285 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that transitional rules
do not preclude deportable aliens governed by IIRIRA "from challenging their
final deportation orders through habeas where they have no other way to assert in
court that their deportation is contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United
States"); Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1145 (10th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 1539 (2000) (same); Requena-Rodriguez, 190 F.3d at 304 (same);
DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Shah v. Reno, 184 F.3d
719, 724 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Mayers v. INS, 175 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir.
1999) (same); Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding habeas
corpus jurisdiction remains under transitional rules).
60. See Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 126 (citing Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits).
61. For a discussion of the similar rationales used, see infra notes 62-88 and
accompanying text.
62. 518 U.S. 651 (1996). The issue in Felker was whether AEDPA sections
106(b) (1) and (b) (2), which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), also eliminated the
United States Supreme Court's original habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241 and 2254. See id. at 660 (noting that Supreme Court retained original
habeas jurisdiction).
63. See Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 126 (noting that many courts have cited Felker
holding disfavoring repeals and have held that § 2241 habeas jurisdiction remains
available).
64. AEDPA of 1996 § 106(b)(3)(E), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (3) (E) (Supp. II
1996).
65. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868). The Court considered the effect of the repeal of an 1867 statute that authorized the federal courts to entertain habeas
corpus proceedings by prisoners. See id. at 86-87 (discussing statute). The Court
found that its prior power to entertain habeas corpus proceedings under the 1789
Judiciary Act was not repealed. See id. at 106 (noting holding).
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because jurisdictional repeals by implication are not favored, AEDPA section 106(b) did not divest the Supreme Court of its original habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.66 With this in mind, the courts
of appeals have held that, because of Felker, only a clear, plain or express
statement removing § 2241 habeas jurisdiction from the district courts will
suffice. 67 These courts subsequently found that there was no mention of
habeas corpus in the transitional jurisdiction-stripping statutes, including
the retroactive INA section 24 2(g); therefore, they held that habeas jurisdiction was not repealed.

68

Second, in upholding habeas jurisdiction, some courts of appeals cite
to the "Suspension Clause" of the United States Constitution. 69 The Suspension Clause states that "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." 70 In Swain v. Pressley7 l the United States
Supreme Court held that although Congress repealed habeas corpus jurisdiction from the district court, the Suspension Clause was not violated because "the substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate
nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus." 72 Under the IIRIRA, however, there is no collateral remedy for criminal aliens. 73 Because there is
no collateral remedy available, the Suspension Clause has been cited by
74
some circuits to uphold habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Third, in dealing with INA section 24 2(g), the federal government
has repeatedly contended that because this provision channels all review
into the courts of appeals as provided by INA section 242, habeasjurisdic66. See Felker, 518 U.S. at 660 (discussing judicial policy that repeals by implication are not favored).
67. See, e.g., Pak v. Reno, 196 F.3d 666, 672-73 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing
Felkerand noting that clear statement is needed to repeal habeas jurisdiction); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Goncalves, 144 F.3d at
119-20 (same).
68. See, e.g.,
Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 121 (concluding that § 2241 habeas jurisdiction has not been repealed because "[h]ad Congress wished to eliminate any
possible habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, it could easily have inserted
an explicit reference, but it did not"); Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir.
1997) (noting that INA section 242(g) "abolishes even review under § 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ [of habeas corpus], unaided by statute").
69. See, e.g., Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 237 (citing Suspension Clause); Jean-Baptiste v. Reno, 144 F.3d 212, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (same).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 2.
71. 430 U.S. 372 (1977). This case considered an amendment to the District
of Columbia Code, modeled after 28 U.S.C. § 2255, that repealed habeas corpus
jurisdiction but substituted a collateral remedy. See id. at 375-76 (stating issue).
72. Swain, 430 U.S. at 381.
73. See generally IIRIRA of 1996 § 309(c) (4) (G), 110 Stat. 3009-626 to -627 (denying criminal aliens judicial review).
74. See, e.g.,
Sandova 166 F.3d at 237 (citing Suspension Clause to support
upholding habeas corpus jurisdiction); Jean-Baptiste, 144 F.3d at 218 (same).
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tion has been repealed. 75 The courts of appeals that have upheld habeas
jurisdiction have dealt with this argument in two ways. 76 First, as stated
above, some courts say that INA section 242(g) does not explicitly mention habeas jurisdiction; therefore, that type of jurisdiction is not repealed.7 7 Secondly, other courts of appeals have countered this argument
by saying that, consistent with American-Arab, final orders of deportation
are not decisions to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders."78 Those courts, however, did not address the issue of
whether habeas jurisdiction was available if the case fell within one of
79
those three categories.
Fourth, as an argument avoiding the repeal of habeas jurisdiction,
some circuits interpret the transitional rules to not destroy habeas jurisdiction in order to avoid constitutional problems. 80 Under Supreme Court
precedent, there is an obligation to read statutes in a manner that avoids
serious constitutional problems. 81 According to Webster v. Doe,82 the
United States Supreme Court has stated that "'serious constitutional question [s]' . . . would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any

judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim."83 According to the
circuits that have considered this issue articulated by Webster, constitutional
problems would arise, implicating the Suspension Clause and Article III, if
75. See, e.g., Pak v. Reno, 196 F.3d 666, 671 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting government's argument); Wallace v. Reno, 194 F.3d 279, 283 (1st Cir. 1999) (same);
Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120
S. Ct. 1539 (2000) (same).
76. For a discussion of INA section 24 2(g), see infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Jurado-Gutierrez,190 F.3d at 1144-47 (noting that habeas corpus
jurisdiction was not repealed by language of AEDPA or IIRIRA).
78. See, e.g., Pak, 196 F.3d at 671 (noting that final orders of deportation are
not subject to INA section 242(g)); Wallace, 194 F.3d at 284 (same); Jurado-Gutierrez, 190 F.3d at 1144 (same); Mayers v. INS, 175 F.3d 1289, 1297 (lth Cir. 1999)
(same). The purpose of this rule was to streamline the process and to prevent
multiple appeals before a final order. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 535 U.S. 471, 485 (1999).
79. See, e.g., Wallace, 194 F.3d at 284 (not discussing effect if case falls within
one of three categories); Pak, 196 F.3d at 671 (same);Jurado-Gutierrez,190 F.3d at
1144 (same); Mayers, 175 F.3d at 1297 (same).
80. See, e.g., Pak, 196 F.3d at 673 (noting that retaining habeas jurisdiction
avoids serious constitutional problems); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 237 (3d
Cir. 1999) (same).
81. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (noting obligation for statutory interpretation); United States ex rel Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366, 408 (1909) (stating that statutory interpretation by courts should avoid "grave
and doubtful constitutional questions").
82. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
83. Webster, 486 U.S. at 603 (citing Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physi-

cians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)).
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84
all forms of judicial review, including habeas corpus, were stricken.
Those circuits have concluded that habeas corpus jurisdiction remains to
review aliens' constitutional challenges and, therefore, have avoided seri85
ous constitutional questions.

Finally, some circuits have interpreted AEDPA section 401 (e), which
repealed INA's section 106(a) (10) habeas jurisdiction for final orders, to
hold that habeas jurisdiction was not revoked.8 6 These courts held that
despite the "sole and exclusive" language of INA section 106(a), INA sec87
tion 106(a) (10) did not provide the only route to habeas corpus review.
Rather, the courts said that habeas corpus review under § 2241 was an
independent option to section 106(a)(10), thus repealing that INA sec88
tion did not also repeal § 2241 habeas jurisdiction.
2.

Circuit Holding Habeas Corpus JurisdictionDoes Not Remain Under
TransitionalRules

While many of the circuits have held that AEDPA and IIRIRA do not
repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit has held otherwise.8 9 In LaGuerre v. Reno,90 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit considered the effect of AEDPA on habeas corpusjurisdic84. See, e.g., Pak, 196 F.3d at 673 (upholding habeas corpus prevents "thorny
constitutional issues"). These constitutional problems include whether these rules
would suspend the writ of habeas corpus contrary to the Suspension Clause of the
United States Constitution. See id. (noting Suspension Clause). Furthermore, repealing habeas corpus may violate Congress's power to strip Article III courts of
jurisdiction. See id. (noting Article III).
85. SeeJean-Baptiste v. Reno, 144 F.3d 212, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing
need for judicial review of criminal aliens' constitutional challenges). But see
LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that although
habeas corpus jurisdiction does not survive, court created exception that "direct
review remains available under section 440(a) for aliens wishing to challenge their
deportation on constitutional grounds").
86. SeeJurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1145 (10th Cir. 1999), cert.
Denied, 120 S. Ct. 1539 (2000) (discussing AEDPA § 401(e)); Mayers v. INS, 175
F.3d 1289, 1298-1300 (11th Cir. 1999) (same); Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110,
121 (1st Cir. 1998) (same).
87. SeeJurado-Gutierrez,190 F.3d at 1145 (noting that § 2241 was alternative
option to INA section 106(a)(10)); Mayers, 175 F.3d at 1298-1300 (same); Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 121 (same).
88. SeeJurado-Gutierrez,190 F.3d at 1145, 1153 (upholding habeas corpus jurisdiction); Mayers, 175 F.3d at 1298-1300 (same); Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 121 (same).
The Tenth Circuit has "frequently recognized the district court's jurisdiction to
hear an alien's habeas corpus claim brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 during
the period from 1961, when Congress enacted INA § 106(a) (10), through 1996."
Jurado-Gutierrez,190 F.3d at 1145.
89. See LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1040 (holding § 2241 habeas corpus jurisdiction
repealed).
90. 164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998). In this case, the defendants had been ordered deported because of drug-related offenses. See id. at 1037 (noting reason for
deportation).
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tion. 9 1 The Seventh Circuit noted that prior to INA section 106, habeas
corpus was the method ofjudicial review for orders of deportation. 92 The
Seventh Circuit said, however, that after section 106, review was directed
towards the court of appeals "without preliminary recourse to the district
courts." 93 The Seventh Circuit then stated that habeas jurisdiction was
preserved by section 106, and that the best analysis of section 106's repeal
94
is that the repeal allowed habeas jurisdiction only in limited situations.
Section 106 was repealed and then replaced by section 440(a). 95 LaGuerre
96
held that this new provision effectively repealed habeas jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit held that the Suspension Clause does
not require preserving statutory habeas jurisdiction.9 7 The Seventh Circuit was "[m]indful of the presumption that executive resolutions of constitutional issues are judicially reviewable" and read an exception into
AEDPA section 440(a) that a "deportee can seek review of constitutional
issues in the court of appeals directly ....-98 This decision to create an
exception, however, has been criticized. 99
3.

Circuits Holding Habeas Corpus JurisdictionDoes Not Remain Under
Permanent Rules
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-

cuits were the first two circuits to discuss the impact of IIRIRA's permanent rules on a federal district court's habeas corpus jurisdiction over
criminal aliens. 10 0 Both courts held that the permanent rules divested the
district courts of their § 2241 habeas jurisdiction over criminal aliens.
In Richardson v. Reno,'0" the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit was the first circuit court to consider the effect of AEDPA
91. See id. (noting criminal aliens' petition for habeas corpus).
92. See id. at 1038 (noting mode of judicial review prior to 1961).
93. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1994)). The stated purpose of channeling
review into the courts of appeals was "to thwart the dilatory tactics frequently employed by the lawyers for deportable aliens." Id. (citing Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217,
225-26 (1963)).
94. See id. (noting best view reconciling INA section 106(a) (10) and § 2241).
95. See id. (noting repeal of INA section 106(a) (10) by AEDPA § 401(e)).
96. See id. at 1040 (noting that habeas corpus did not survive).
97. See id. at 1038 (doubting that Suspension Clause requires preserving

habeas corpus to challenge final orders of deportation). The LaGuerre court said
that at the time of the enactment of the Constitution, habeas corpus was extremely
limited. See id. (noting original reach of habeas corpus). Congress subsequently
authorized a broader reading of habeas corpus. See id. (noting habeas corpus was
broadened). The Seventh Circuit held, however, that "it cannot be that curtailing
an 'optional' statutory enlargement violates the [S]uspension [C]lause." Id.
98. Id. at 1040 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)).
99. See Wallace v. Reno, 194 F.3d 279, 284-85 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that
LaGuerreis "at odds with the explicit statutory bar on any direct review contained in
AEDPA § 440(a)").
100. For a discussion of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit decisions, see infra
notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
101. 180 F.3d 1311 (lth Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1529 (2000).
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and IIRIRA's permanent rules on a district court's § 2241 habeas jurisdiction. 10 2 Here, the Eleventh Circuit held that the overall judicial review
scheme enacted in INA section 242 repealed § 2241 jurisdiction.10 3 The
Richardson court said that AEDPA's repeal of habeas jurisdiction under
INA section 106 and the express provision in INA section 242(e) (2) for
limited jurisdiction indicated congressional intent to repeal § 2241 habeas
jurisdiction. 10 4 Furthermore, the Richardson court noted that INA section
242(b) (9) is "a sort of 'zipper' clause that says 'no judicial review in deportation cases unless this section provides judicial review.' 10 5 It then held
that § 2241 habeas jurisdiction was repealed and that, in order to seek
judicial review, criminal aliens must wait for a final removal order and
then proceed to the court of appeals under a petition for review as provided for in INA section 242.106 At first glance, the "no court shall have
jurisdiction to review any final order of removal" language of INA section
242 seems to preclude the Richardson court's suggestion for the criminal
alien to petition for review. The court held, however, that there is sufficient review under INA section 242(a) (2) (C) because the appeals court
has jurisdiction to determine if the jurisdictional bar applies to that person.10 7 Furthermore, the Richardson court curiously stated that "[i]f the
bar applies, jurisdiction remains to consider whether the level of judicial
review remaining . . . in a particular case satisfies the Suspension

Clause." 08 The court also noted that INA section 242(a) (2) (C) does not
prevent constitutional questions; rather, the section deals with operational
decisions made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). 10 9
Therefore, even though criminal aliens do not have the right to petition
102. See id. at 1313 n.2 (noting permanent rules apply in this case).
103. See id. at 1315 (holding that IIRIRA precludes § 2241 habeas
jurisdiction).
104. See id. at 1314 (noting that INA section 242(e) (2) evinces congressional
intent to preclude statutory habeas corpus review in this situation).
105. Id. at 1315 (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
U.S. 471, 483 (1999)). The Richardson court stated that "[a]s the Supreme Court
stated, INA § 242 was intended to assure that issues of law and fact are not subject
to 'separate rounds of litigation.'" Id. (citing American-Arab, 525 U.S. at 485).
106. See id. (noting constitutionality of limitation on § 2241 by IIRIRA). The
Richardson court held that the combination of the "zipper clause," along with the
broad revisions of INA section 242, are sufficient enough for the requirements in
Felker to repeal habeas corpus review. See id.
107. See id. (noting criminal aliens' rights). In determining whether the jurisdictional bar applies, the court will "determine whether [the person] is actually an
alien, is deportable, and deportable for a reason covered by INA § 242(a) (2) (C)
Id. at 1316.
108. Id. The Richardsoncourt also noted that if the bar does not apply, then a
criminal alien can pursue judicial review of constitutional and statutory issues
under INA sections 242(b) (2) and 242(b) (9). See id. (noting alternatives for judicial review).
109. See id. at 1316 n.5 (noting applicability of INA section 242(a) (2) (C)).
The Richardson court cited to Webster and LaGuere for this proposition. See id.
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for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eleventh Circuit, these aliens are provided a source of constitutional review.
In Max-George v. Reno,110 the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit was the second circuit court to consider the effects of the
AEDPA's and IIRIRA's permanent rules on a district court's § 2241 habeas
corpus jurisdiction.1 11 Although the Fifth Circuit previously held that
habeas corpus jurisdiction remains under the transitional rules, the MaxGeorge court held that the permanent rules divest the district courts of
112
their § 2241 habeas jurisdiction over criminal aliens.
The Max-George court first held that the combination of the "notwithstanding any other provision of law" language in INA section
242(a) (2) (C), along with § 2241 being "any other provision of law," and
the Supreme Court's characterizing INA section 242(b) (9) as "an unmistakable 'zipper' clause," though not as explicit as mentioning habeas
corpus in the statute, evinces sufficiently explicit congressional to repeal
§ 2241 habeas jurisdiction under Felker.113 Second, the Max-George court
stated that " [ t] o some degree, IIRIRA's stripping of § 2241 jurisdiction implicates the guarantee that the 'Privilege of the Writ' preserved by the
Constitution can not be suspended," but the court went on to note that
the distinction between the writ preserved in the Suspension Clause and
the writ available in § 2241 is "immaterial when considered in the immigration context, where ...

Congress regularly makes rules that would be

unacceptable if applied to citizens." 14 The court stated, however, that the
breadth of the Suspension Clause need not be considered here because
there is still judicial review that is substantial enough to satisfy any Suspension Clause claim a criminal alien may raise. 1 1 5 The judicial review that
remains is the court's determination, under INA section 242(a) (2) (C),
whether "(1) the specific conditions that bar jurisdiction in the court of
appeals exist, (2) the conditions barring jurisdiction are constitutionally
applied to the petitioner, and (3) the level of judicial review remaining is
constitutionally adequate .... 1,,16 As of the date of this publication, the
Eleventh and Fifth Circuits are the only two circuits holding that the permanent rules have divested the district courts of their § 2241 jurisdiction.
110. 205 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 23, 2000)
(No. 00-6280).
111. See id. at 197 (noting matter of first impression).
112. See id. at 199 (noting holding).
113. See id. at 197-99 (analyzing IIRIRA's permanent rules). The Max-George
court also noted that Congress was aware of the Felker decision because Felker was
decided three months before IIRIRA was enacted. See id. at 198 (noting timing of
Felker decision).
114. Id. at 201 (citing Reno v. Fores, 507 U.S. 292, 305-06 (1993)).
115. See id. at 202 (noting that "any Suspension Clause guarantee which MaxGeorge can claim is satisfied").
116. Id.
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The Third Circuit is the only other circuit to discuss the impact of the
permanent rules on habeas jurisdiction. 117
III.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT UPHOLDS

§ 2241

HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION

UNDER BOTH TRANSITIONAL AND PERMANENT RULES

The Third Circuit has recently considered the effect of AEDPA and
IIRIRA on criminal aliens' right to judicial review of deportation orders
and their effect on habeas corpus jurisdiction under both the transitional
and permanent rules.' 18 One of the first decisions by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was Sandoval v. Reno, upheld the
right to habeas corpus for a criminal alien who fell within the transitional
rules. 19 Furthermore, the Third Circuit subsequently considered a crimi120
nal alien's right to judicial review and habeas corpus in Catney v. INS
and DeSousa v. Reno.

21

Finally, in Liang v. INS, the Third Circuit upheld

41

§ 22 's grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction in the district courts under
122
the permanent rules.
A.
1.

Sandoval v. Reno

Background of Sandoval

In Sandoval v. Reno, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that criminal aliens under the transitional rules retained the right of
§ 2241 habeas corpus review after the enactment of AEDPA and
IIRIRA. 123 Sandoval filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asserting a violation
of his equal protection rights, and that a provision of the INA, amended
by AEDPA, did not apply to him. 12 4 The district court held that it had
117. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision, see infra notes 177-205
and accompanying text.
118. See Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing 1996
acts); DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Catney v. INS, 178
F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999)
(same); Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 1998) (same).

119. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 237 (concluding that criminal aliens retained
habeas corpus jurisdiction).

The Sandoval court stated that "because neither

AEDPA nor IIRIRA contains a clear statement that Congress sought to eliminate
habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 2241, we conclude that § 2241 survives the 1996 amendments." Id. at 238.
120. For a discussion of Catney, see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of DeSousa, see infra notes 171-70 and accompanying

text.
122. For a discussion of Liang, see infra notes 177-204 and accompanying text.
123. See Sandova4 166 F.3d at 237 (holding that district court retained jurisdiction over habeas corpus petition).
124. See id. at 228. Sandoval, who is a citizen of Mexico, entered the United
States and was later granted permanent resident status. See id. After Sandoval was
granted the right to remain in the United States in order to qualify for citizenship,
he was convicted of marijuana possession and was subject to deportation. See id.
Sandoval then requested that he be granted a four-month stay in order to meet the
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25
retained habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 to hear the claims asserted.'
The case, including whether the district court had jurisdiction, was subse26
quently brought up on appeal.'
Sandoval first discussed the applicable transitional changes that
evolved from AEDPA and IIRIRA, including the retroactive INA section
242(g).1 27 The Third Circuit then proceeded to review recent cases construing these 1996 amendments. 128 The Third Circuit noted that the
First, Second and Ninth Circuits had held that, notwithstanding these
129
amendments, the district courts retained habeas corpus jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the court stated that the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits held
seven-year legal immigrant qualification so that he would be eligible for discretionary relief under INA section 212(c). See id. This discretionary relief would have
allowed the Attorney General to use discretion to admit Sandoval as a citizen, notwithstanding that he was deportable. See id. The immigration judge denied this
request for a stay. See id. Sandoval then turned to the Board of Immigration Appeals to have that decision reviewed. See id. While the appeal was pending, AEDPA
was passed-repealing the discretionary relief for persons in Sandoval's position.
See id. Because of the statute, the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Sandoval's appeal, making the deportation order administratively final. See id. Within
this time, however, Sandoval attained the seven-year requirement before his deportation. See id. For that reason, Sandoval filed a motion for the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen his case, and he also filed a motion to the district court to
request a stay. See id. The motion for the stay was denied. See id. Therefore, Sandoval filed a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, asserting that INA section
212(c) does not apply to him and that section 212(c) violates equal protection. See
id.
125. See id. (noting that district court held that it retained habeas jurisdiction). Furthermore, the district court held that the AEDPA did not apply to Sandoval, and ordered the INS to entertain his INA section 212(c) request. See id. at
228-29 (noting district court's holding).
126. See id. at 229 (noting that government appealed district court's decision).
"While this appeal was pending, the BIA denied Sandoval's motion to reopen, and
Sandoval then filed a Petition for Review with [the court of appeals]." Id. The
appeal and the Petition for Review were subsequently combined. See id.
127. See id. at 229-30 (discussing statutory changes). For a discussion of the
transitional changes that took place under AEDPA and IIRIRA, see supra notes 3354 and accompanying text.
128. See Sandova4 166 F.3d at 230-31 (discussing cases).
129. See id. at 230 (citing circuit cases). The Sandoval court cited to other
circuits, including Goncalves v. Reno, 114 F.3d 110 (lst Cir. 1998), which held that
Congress did not eliminate § 2241 habeas corpus jurisdiction, and Henderson v.
INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), which reasoned that § 2241 habeas remained
intact and preserved the constitutionality of the foreclosure ofjudicial review. Furthermore, Sandoval noted that while the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit did not reach this issue, the district court in that circuit held that § 2241 jurisdiction was not repealed by either AEDPA or IIRIRA. See
Sandova4 166 F.3d at 230 (discussing Lee v. Reno, 15 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 1998)).
The Sandoval court also stated that other circuits that had not directly addressed
the issue had held that because AEDPA and IIRIRA divested the district courts of
jurisdiction to entertain Petitions for Review, the courts retained some degree of
habeas corpus jurisdiction. See id. at 231 (citing Lerma de Garcia v. INS, 141 F.3d
215, 217 (5th Cir. 1998); Mansourv.INS, 123 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 1997); Ramallo
v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1154
n.3 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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otherwise.' 3 0 Sandoval then reiterated its previous holding that AEDPA
section 440(a) had precluded the court from hearing claims of legal error
13
in a petition for review filed by a criminal alien. '
Second, the court analyzed the "longstanding doctrine disfavoring repeals of jurisdictional statutes by implication." 132 In order to do so, the
circuit examined Ex parte Yerger,133 Ex parte McCardle'34 and Felker.13 5 The
court concluded that these decisions, "[r]ead together[,] ...establish the
propositions that courts should not lightly presume that a congressional
enactment containing general language effects a repeal of a jurisdictional
statute, and, consequently, that only a plain statement of congressional
130. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 230-31 (noting holdings of Seventh and Eleventh Circuits). The Sandoval court cited to Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1388 (11 th
Cir. 1998), affid, Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 1529 (2000), which held that IIRIRA amendments eliminated § 2241
habeas corpus jurisdiction, and LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998),
which noted that AEDPA section 440(a) deprived the district court of habeas
corpus jurisdiction for criminal aliens. The Seventh Circuit, however, created an
exception to AEDPA by allowing criminal aliens to bring constitutional challenges
in a petition for review, notwithstanding the general bar in AEDPA. See LaGuerre,
164 F.3d at 1040 (noting exception).
131. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 231 (citing Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248 (3d Cir.
1998)).
132. Id.
133. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
134. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
135. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 231-32 (citing Supreme Court precedent). For
a discussion of Felker, see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. In order to
substantively examine Felker, the Sandoval court analyzed Yerger and McCardle. See
Sandova4 166 F.3d at 231-32.
The Sandoval court noted that in McCardle, the Court was entertaining a
habeas petition. See id. at 232 (discussing McCardle). The Court had jurisdiction to
hear the appeal based on an 1867 statute granting appellate jurisdiction. See id. In
1868, while the case was pending, Congress passed a bill that repealed the section
of the statute granting the habeas proceedings. See id. The Court held that its
appellate jurisdiction was stripped. See id. Sandoval noted, however, that McCardle
was not faced with a statute that stripped all review from the Court. See id. (noting
limitation of jurisdiction-stripping statute). Furthermore, McCardle stated that
"[c]ounsel seems to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing act in question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied. But this is an error .... [The statute repealing 1867 jurisdiction] does not
affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) at 515.
Next, Sandoval noted that Yerger analyzed the same statute repealing jurisdiction in McCardle. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 232. The Court, however, addressed its
habeas jurisdiction under the 1789 Judiciary Act. See id. (discussing Yerger). Yerger
held that the 1868 statute did not repeal its habeas jurisdiction. See id. (noting
Yerger's holding). The Court went on to say:
[T]here are no repealing words in the Act of 1867. If it repealed the Act
of 1789, it did so by implication .... Repeals by implication are not

favored. They are seldom admitted except on the ground of repugnancy;
and never, we think, when the former Act can stand together with the
new Act.
Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105 (1868).
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13 6
intent to remove a particular statutory grant ofjurisdiction will suffice."
With this idea in mind, the court then proceeded to examine each of the

transitional amendments.
2.

13 7

Sandoval Court's Analysis of AEDPA Section 401(e)

The Sandoval court began its analysis by examining AEDPA section
401(e), the provision that struck INA's section 106(a) (10) habeas jurisdiction, which the government contended eliminated § 2241 habeas corpus
jurisdiction.1 3 8 In analyzing this issue, the court examined the history of
habeas corpus for immigrants more thoroughly than any other appeals
court. The court began by noting that even though section 106(a)(10)
was enacted as part of the 1961 Immigration and Nationality Act, "habeas
jurisdiction over the Executive's detention of aliens has considerably
longer lineage."' 3 9 This jurisdiction was recognized in 1888 by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. JungAh Lung.' 40 The Third Circuit continued by stating that Congress, prompted by dissatisfaction with
judicial intervention in this area, enacted the Immigration Act of 1891,
which stated that: "All decisions made by the inspection officers ... shall
be final unless [appealed to the relevant executive officers.]" 14 1 The court
noted, however, that the Supreme Court upheld the availability of habeas
notwithstanding the finality provision. 14 2 The Immigration Act of 1917
was then passed and carried forward the provisions that the Attorney General's deportation decisions were final.' 4 3 The Administrative Procedures
Act ("APA") was then passed, and the United States Supreme Court in
136. Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 232.
137. See id. (stating "[i]nformed by this, we examine each of the 1996 statutory provisions").
138. For a discussion of these rules, see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying
text.
139. Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 233.

140. 124 U.S. 621 (1888). In this case, a Chinese laborer, who was being held
in executive detention, filed for a writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 623. The Court
rejected the argument that general statutory habeas jurisdiction "was taken away by
the Chinese Restriction Act, which regulated the entire subject matter, and was
necessarily exclusive." Id. at 626. The Court then stated that "[w]e see nothing in
these Acts which in any manner affects the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States to issue a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 628-29.
141. Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 233. The court cited to a commentator for the
proposition that " [t] hese finality provisions were apparently prompted by congressional dissatisfaction with judicial intervention in this area." Id. (citing Neuman,
supra note 12, at 1008).
142. See id. (citing NishimuraEkiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)). The
Court in Nishimura Ekiu stated that "[a]n alien immigrant, prevented from landing
by any such officer claiming authority to do so under an act of Congress, and
thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to
ascertain whether the restraint is lawful." Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651, 660 (1892). From this, the Sandoval court reasoned, the writ of habeas
corpus was firmly established over one hundred years ago. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d
at 233 (noting establishment of right).
143. See id. (discussing consequences of Immigration Act of 1917).
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Heikkila v. Barber14 4 decided that the judicial review provided by the APA
did not extend to immigration cases. 14 5 The Third Circuit, however,
pointed out that "the Court expressly concluded that habeas jurisdiction
persisted even during this period, stating that in light of its decision that
the APA did not enlarge the alien's rights, 'he may attack a deportation
order only by habeas corpus."1 46 After this decision, the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 superseded the 1917 Act.' 47 Sandoval recognized
that in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,14 8 the United States Supreme Court held
that aliens could seek APA judicial review in the district courts and the
courts of appeals. This decision came in spite of the fact that the 1952 Act
retained the provision providing for finality of deportation decisions made
149
by the Attorney General.
Sandoval then noted that Congress in 1961 amended the Immigration
and Nationality Act150 in light of this backdrop.' 51 The court reasoned
that the "sole and exclusive" language of this act was not addressed to
habeas jurisdiction, but was addressed to the judicial review provided
under the APA.' 52 Sandoval then stated that section 106(a) (10) was not a
144. 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
145. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 233 (noting conclusion in Heikkila). Sandoval
noted that the Court in Heikkila held that "the Immigration Act was 'a statute precluding judicial review' within the meaning of the APA." Id. To reach this conclusion, the Court examined the period between 1891 and 1952 and noted that the
legislation "clearly had the effect of precluding judicial intervention in deportation
cases except insofar as it was required by the Constitution." Heikkila, 345 U.S. at
234-35.
146. Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 233 (quoting Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 235).
147. See id.
148. 349 U.S. 48 (1955). Shaughnessy examined the APA to determine
whether it applied to cases that arose under the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952. See id. (discussing APA). The United States Supreme Court specifically
focused on the section that provided: "No subsequent legislation shall be held to
supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly." 60 Stat. at 244 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009). The Court made it clear that "the subsequent 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act [provides] no language which 'expressly' supersedes or modifies the
expanded right of review granted by § 10 of the [APA]." Shaughnessy, 349 U.S. at
51. Therefore, the Court held that the APA's "generous review provision" permitted deportation challenges under the Declaratory Judgment Act were subject to
review by the district court. See id.
149. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 234 (noting result of 1952 Act). Aliens were
therefore permitted to petition for APA judicial review in the various courts of
appeals and district courts as a result of Shaughnessy. See id. (noting affect of
Shaughnessy decision).
150. INA of 1952, sec. 5(a), § 106, 75 Stat. 650, 651 (1961).
151. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 234 (noting congressional passage of INA).
152. See id. (stating that historical sequence supports this proposition). The
Sandoval court reasoned that by "locating APA review power in the courts of appeals, Congress sought to eliminate APA review by means of declaratory judgment
actions in the district courts, a form of review that Shaughnessy had permitted." Id.
The court continued by stating that "[t]he 'sole and exclusive' provision was not,
as the government suggests, an effort to make APA review in the circuits work to
the exclusion of habeas action." Id. (citing Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 231 (1963).
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new right that conferred habeas jurisdiction on the district courts, but "is
best understood as congressional acknowledgment that the district courts
continued to have habeas jurisdiction even though APA review was channeled to the courts of appeals." 153 Therefore, the court held, this refutes
the contention that AEDPA section 401 (e) repealed the original grant of
habeas corpus jurisdiction embodied in § 2241 and does not overcome the
15 4
presumption against finding repeals by implication.
3.

Sandoval Court's Analysis of AEDPA Section 440(a) and IIRIRA Section
309(c)(4)(G)

Next, Sandoval analyzed the transitional rules. 15 5 The court held that
because neither of the two transitional rules specifically mentioned habeas
jurisdiction under § 2241, there was not a sufficiently clear statement of
intent to repeal the general grant of habeas jurisdiction under Felker and
Yerger.1 5 6 Furthermore, the court held that references to "review" in
AEDPA, and "appeal" in IIRIRA, are properly understood to relate tojudiSandoval noted that the court in Foti held that its decision in that case-that the
court of appeals has initial, exclusive jurisdiction to review denial of suspension of
deportation-"in no way impairs the preservation and availability of habeas corpus
relief." Id.
153. Id. Legislative history states that INA section 106(a)(10) was added to
prevent a constitutional problem if the "sole and exclusive" language were interpreted to bar the courts from hearing petitions for habeas corpus. See id. The
House Report states:
The section clearly specifies that the right to habeas corpus is preserved
to an alien in custody under a deportation order. In that fashion, it excepts habeas corpus from the language which elsewhere declares that the
procedure prescribed for judicial review in circuits courts shall be exclusive. The section in no way disturbs the Habeas Corpus Act in respect to
the courts which may issue writs of habeas corpus: aliens are not limited
to courts of appeals in seeking habeas corpus.
H.R. REP. No. 87-1086, at 29 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2973.
Therefore, Sandoval concluded that INA section 106(a) (10) did not confer habeas
jurisdiction on the district court; "[s]uch jurisdiction, recognized since the late
nineteenth century, existed independently of the 1961 Act." Sandoval, 166 F.3d at
234.
154. See Sandova4 166 F.3d at 234-35 (noting presumption against appeal by
implication was not overcome). The Sandoval court also noted that the title of
AEDPA section 401 (e), "Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus," is not
dispositive because a title alone cannot limit the meaning of the text, and there is
nothing in the text of AEDPA which references habeas corpus. See id. at 235
("'[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. For
interpretive purposes, [it is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous work or phrase.'" (citing PennsylvaniaDep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206
(1998) (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio PR. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29
(1947))).
155. For a discussion of the transitional rules, see supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
156. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 235 (noting conclusion). For a discussion of
Felker and Yerger, see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
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cial review under the APA. 157 The court supported this proposition by
stating that the Court in Heikkila "was clear that 'judicial review' precluded
by the 1917 Acts did not include habeas corpus."1 5 8 Therefore, the transitional rules foreclosed judicial review under the APA and did not repeal
59
§ 2241 habeas jurisdiction.1
4.

Sandoval Court's Analysis of INA Section

2 42

(g)

Continuing its analysis, the court considered the issue of whether INA
section 2 4 2(g) repealed habeas corpus jurisdiction over criminal aliens
from the district courts. Sandoval held that because this provision does not
expressly repeal § 2241, the principle disfavoring implied repeals upholds
habeas jurisdiction. 160 This decision came in spite of Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,1 6 1 a United States Supreme Court opinion
holding that the principle disfavoring repeals by implication did not apply. 1 62 Sandoval however, held that Amerada Hess was not dispositive because the applicability of the repealed statute Amerada Hess was uncertain,
and there was no long history of jurisdiction in that type of case. 163 Be157. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 235 (noting what words "review" and "appeal"
reference). The Sandoval court stated that this conclusion is warranted because "in
the immigration context, the Court has historically drawn a sharp distinction between 'judicial review'-meaning APA review-and the courts' power to entertain
petitions for writs of habeas corpus." Id. Furthermore, Heikkila rejected the holdings of three courts of appeals that "[took] the position that habeas corpus itself
represented judicial review." Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1953).
158. Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 235 (citing Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 235-36). It is presumed that Congress knew the distinction between judicial review and habeas
corpus because "[i]t is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 696-97 (1979). Also, "it is not only appropriate but ... realistic to presume
that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important precedents
from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in conformity with them." Id.
159. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 235 (noting court's conclusion).
160. See id. (noting that principles of Felker and Yerger apply). For a discussion
of Yerger, Felker and the principle disfavoring repeals ofjurisdiction, see supra notes
62-68 and accompanying text.
161. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
162. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 236 (noting Supreme Court's conclusion in
Amerada Hess). The Supreme Court stated that the principle did not apply because
"Congress' decision to deal comprehensively with the subject of foreign sovereign
immunity in the FSIA, and the express provision [granting immunity to foreign
states except as provided by the FISA,] preclude a construction of the Alien Tort
Statute" that would allow foreign states to be sued. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 438.
163. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 236 (noting that "Amerada Hess does not tilt the
determination here in favor of the government's position [that INA section 2 4 2(g)
repealed habeas jurisdiction]"). Because the statute was uncertain, the Court
stated that:
Congress's failure in the FSIA to enact an express pro tanto repealer of
the Alien Tort Statute speaks only faintly, if at all, to the issue involved in
this case. In light of the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme in
the FSIA, we doubt that even the most meticulous draftsman would have
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cause there is a long history of habeas corpus jurisdiction available to
aliens held in executive custody, Sandoval concluded that jurisdiction
1 64
under § 2241 is preserved.
5.

Sandoval Court's ConstitutionalDiscussion

Finally, Sandoval discussed two principles of statutory interpretation. 165 First, the court said that its interpretation complies with the judicial requirement to interpret statutes to "avoid serious constitutional
problems, such as those [it] would face were IIRIRA read to take away
habeas jurisdiction as well as APA review."1 66 Secondly, the court noted
that repealing all review of executive detention, including habeas corpus,
would not satisfy the Suspension Clause. 167 Therefore, the court held
that, despite AEDPA and IIRIRA, criminal aliens still retain habeas corpus
jurisdiction under § 2241.168
concluded that Congress also needed to amend pro tanto the Alien Tort
Statute.
Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 437.
164. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 237-38 (holding that habeas jurisdiction remains intact). For the proposition that precedent historically supports habeas
corpus jurisdiction for aliens, the court cites Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (7 Cranch) 75
(1807). In Boilman, the United States Supreme Court commented on the Judiciary
Act of 1789, § 2241's predecessor, stating:
[T]his act was passed by the first Congress of the United States, sitting
under a constitution which had declared "that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus should not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety might require it."
Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they must
have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means
by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity;
for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost,
although no law for its suspension should be enacted.
Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 95.
165. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 237-38 (discussing constitutional
considerations).
166. Id. at 237 (citing EdwardJ DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); United States ex rel. Attorney General
v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
167. See id.(discussing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977)). For a further
discussion of the Suspension Clause and substitution of a collateral remedy, see
supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. After discussing Swain, the Sandoval
court stated that a "statute removing all review of executive detention, however,
would not provide an adequate and effective collateral remedy." Sandoval, 166
F.3d at 237.
The government also contended that there was an effective collateral remedy
because courts of appeals could still entertain claims of substantial constitutional
error. See id. (noting government contention). The Sandoval court, however, rejected this argument because neither act provides for that type of review. See id.
(rejecting government's contention).
168. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 238 (noting that § 2241 survives 1996 acts).
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Catney v. INS and DeSousa v. Reno

Following Sandova, the impact of AEDPA and IIRIRA's transitional
rules was considered by the Third Circuit in Catney and DeSousa. In Catney,
the Third Circuit held that courts no longer have jurisdiction to entertain
criminal aliens' Petitions of Review of final orders, "including such aliens'
claims of statutory or constitutional error." 1 69 Furthermore, in DeSousa,
the Third Circuit held that INA section 242(g), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in American-Arab, did not apply to the appellee and did not
affect the remainder of Sandoval's ruling regarding criminal aliens' right
to habeas corpus.1 70 Despite these decisions, the District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania held that American-Arab requires a different result and, despite DeSousa's discussion and examination of the applicability of American-Arab to habeas corpus jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
granted by § 2241 was effectively repealed. 171 The other district courts in
the Third Circuit, however, have followed the decisions handed down by
172
the court of appeal.
C.

Liang v. INS

Liang was the final decision in a flurry of cases dealing with the judicial review amendments of AEDPA and IIRIRA. 173 The Third Circuit, creating a division between itself and the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, held
that the district courts retain their § 2241 habeas corpus jurisdiction in
169. Catney v. INS, 178 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 1999). The Catney court noted
that it was unclear whether Sandoval had denied the court of appeals jurisdiction
to hear claims of "substantial constitutional error." See id. (concluding court of
appeals does not have such jurisdiction).
170. See DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing
affect of American-Arab on habeas corpus jurisdiction).
171. SeeJacques v. Reno, 73 F. Supp. 2d 477, 481 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (holding
that, regardless of Sandoval, American-Arab "compels a conclusion that the provisions of IIRIRA which bar judicial review prevent the assertion of habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 as well").
172. See, e.g., Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999) (following
Third Circuit decisions); Velasquez v. Reno, 37 F. Supp. 2d 663 (D.N.J. 1999)
(same).
173. See Liang v. INS, 206 F.3d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 2000). This Liang decision
involved the consolidation of three cases to determine whether the appeals court
has jurisdiction over a petition for review of a criminal alien's deportation order.
See id. The court noted that a necessary issue to decide was whether the district
courts retain habeas corpus jurisdiction under § 2241 subsequent to IIRIRA's permanent rules. See id. The court stated that they had "held that AEDPA and the
transitional rules of IIRIRA deprived us of jurisdiction over a petition for review
from a final order of removal entered against an alien convicted of certain crimes
listed in the statutes." Id. at 310 (citing Catney, 178 F.3d at 190; Morel v. INS, 144
F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 1998)). The Liang court went on to note, however, that "the
district courts retain jurisdiction under the general statutory grant of habeas
corpus jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to review statutory and constitutional challenges to the deportation order." Id. (citing Sandova4 166 F.3d at 225; DeSousa, 190
F.3d at 175).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss4/5

26

Droskoski: Criminal Aliens Get Pinched: Sandoval v. Reno, AEDPA's and IIRIRA

2000]

CASEBRIEF

spite of the restrictions in IIRIRA's permanent rules. 174 The importance
of this issue is noted by the American Civil Liberties Union and a group of
75
twenty-six law professors, both filing amicus briefs.'
1.

Liang's Discussion of AEDPA's and IIPIRA's TransitionalRules

The Third Circuit began its analysis of this issue by discussing AEDPA
and the transitional rules of IIRIRA. 1 76 The court discussed its reasoning
for previously holding that habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the dis17 7
trict courts subsequent to the passage of IIRIRA's transitional rules.
The court then noted that the "vast majority of other courts of appeals
have adopted principles similar to those enunciated in Sandoval and have
also found the district courts retain habeas jurisdiction after the enactment of AEDPA's and IIRIRA's transitional rules." 178 The court also
noted that the Seventh Circuit has held otherwise. 179 The court then went
on to analyze the permanent rules of IIRIRA. 8 0
2.

Liang Court's Analysis of Repeals by Implication

The Liang court first quoted the relevant provisions of IIRIRA's permanent rules, including INA sections 242(a) (2) (C) and 242(b) (9).181
The court stated that "l[t] here is no reason why the jurisdictional rulings in
this case under the permanent rules should be any different than that we
reached under the transitional rules."1 82 While the language of the transitional and permanent rules are different, the court noted that these comprehensive provisions are comparable. 18 3 Furthermore, and more
important, the court noted that because the language, "notwithstanding
any other provision of law," which appeared in the transitional and which
also appears in the permanent rules, did not then persuade the court that
habeas corpus jurisdiction should be repealed, "there is no reason why it
would have a different effect now."' 8 4 Therefore, if the government were
to succeed, it had to convince the court that other language of the perma8 5
nent rules required a different result.1
174. See id. at 323 (noting that its "decision perpetuates the division in the
courts of appeals interpreting the amendments to the immigration laws").
175. See id. at 310.
176. See id. at 313.
177. See id. at 313-15.
178. Id. at 315.
179. See id. at 316 (noting that Seventh Circuit, in "interpreting AEDPA and
the transitional rules, has held to the contrary").
180. See id. at 316-23 (analyzing permanent rules).
181. See id. at 316-17.
182. Id. at 317.
183. See id. (noting similarity of provisions).
184. Id.
185. See id. (noting that government tried to convince court that section
242(b) (9) required different result). For a discussion of the permanent rules, see
supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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The major problem with concluding that the language under the permanent rules should produce a contrary result to that reached under the
transitional rules, the court noted, is that neither section 242(a) (2) (C)
18 6
nor section 242(b) (9) refers to § 2241 or habeas corpus jurisdiction.
This distinction is important because Liang noted its prior pronouncement in Sandoval that, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Felker, "a repeal of habeas jurisdiction will not be found by implication"
and stated that this holding is applicable to the permanent rules.1 87 The
court then said that there have not been "intervening developments" in
188
American-Arab that require the reconsideration of this idea in Sandoval.
The potential intervening development that the Third Circuit analyzes is the Supreme Court's statement in American-Arab that INA's section
18 9
Al242(b)(9) forum limitation is an "unmistakable 'zipper' clause."
though Liang noted that section 242(b) (9) was a broader provision than
section 242(g), the court stated that the Supreme Court did not consider
whether this provision eliminated habeas jurisdiction.1 90 Furthermore,
American-Arab has noted the controversy and left open the issue about
whether the district courts are deprived of their habeas corpus jurisdiction. 191 Therefore, the court stated that, as in the transitional rules, section 242(b)(9) did not express an intent to divest the district courts of
19 2
their § 2241 habeas jurisdiction.
3.

Liang Court's Discussion of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits

The Liang court next went on to discuss the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' decisions, which both held that the permanent rules divested the
district courts of their habeas jurisdiction.1 93 While discussing the decision in Richardson, the Liang court focused primarily on the United States
19 4
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Max-George.
The Third Circuit stated that Max-George held the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law" in section 242(a) (2) (C) "'clearly pre186. See id. (noting that permanent rules do not "expressly refer to habeas
jurisdiction or to § 2241").
187. Id. (discussing Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999) and citing
Felker v. Trupin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996)).
188. Id. at 318.

189. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483
(1999).
190. See Liang, 206 F.3d at 318 (noting Supreme Court's lack of consideration
of issue). Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision was regarding a civil suit for
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, not a petition for habeas corpus under § 2241. See
id. (noting posture of case).
191. See American-Arab, 525 U.S. at 480 n.7 (noting circuit split).
192. See Liang, 206 F.3d at 319 (noting lack of congressional intent to divest
district courts of habeas jurisdiction).
193. See id. at 219-21 (discussing Fifth and Eleventh Circuit decisions that held
to contrary).
194. See id. (discussing cases).
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cludes habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.' ' 195 The Liang court,

noted however, that this language did not preclude habeas jurisdiction in
Sandoval and also stated that the review which the rule references is judicial review under the APA and not review of petitions for habeas
corpus. 19 6 The Liang court said Max-George's conclusion that habeas
corpus is "'any other provision of law' fails to recognize or give effect to
this historical distinction maintained by successive Supreme Court opinions." 197 Furthermore, the court said that both the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuit decisions "to repeal habeas jurisdiction under the belief that Congress need not explicitly mention habeas corpus in order to repeal the
district court's habeas jurisdiction, [is] at odds .. . with the reasoning of
the other courts of appeals that have read the Supreme Court's precedent . . to require explicit statutory reference to habeas or § 2241 to
effect congressional repeal of habeas jurisdiction."1 98 Therefore, the
court in Liangsaid that if Congress wanted to repeal habeas jurisdiction, it
would have made its intent explicit in the statute. 199
4.

Liang Court's Discussion of the Suspension Clause

The Liang court finally discussed the Suspension Clause of the Consti20 0
tution and its protection of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
First, the court disagreed with Max-George "to the extent the court's discussion suggests that aliens are not entitled to the constitutional protection of
habeas corpus," and said that "the Supreme Court cases cited and discussed in detail in Sandoval ... pronounce precisely the opposite." 20 1 Sec-

ond, the Third Circuit stated that the Suspension Clause would not be
violated if the district courts were divested of their habeas jurisdiction so
long as there is "'a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention.' 20 2 The Liang court
noted however, that because there is no provision giving the circuit courts
jurisdiction to examine substantial constitutional claims, habeas corpus jurisdiction must remain in the district courts to avoid a violation of the
195. Id. at 319 (quoting Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir.
2000)).
196. See id. at 319-20 (noting holding in Sandoval compared to Max-George).
197. Id. at 320.
198. Id.

199. See id. at 321 (stating Congress should have made its intent explicit in
statute if Congress wanted to repeal habeas jurisdiction). The Liang court also
noted that "this approach obviates the serious constitutional problems that would
arise were we to adhere to our previous opinions holding we have no jurisdiction
over petitions for review filed by an alien with a criminal convictions and read the
permanent rules to strip the district courts of habeas jurisdiction." Id.
200. See id. (discussing Suspension Clause). For a discussion of the Suspension Clause, see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
201. Id. (citing Supreme Court precedent).
202. Id. (quoting Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977)).
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Suspension Clause. 20 3 The Third Circuit concluded by saying that many
judges would prefer a system where the alien's constitutional and statutory
claims are reviewed in the court of appeals directly, but that "it is not the
way in which we read the legislation ...

and it is our obligation to inter-

pret the statutes we are given, while at the same time interpreting the Con20 4
stitution in accord with the Supreme Court's precedent."
IV.

PRACTITIONER NOTES AND CONCLUSION

In sum, the passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA has created much confusion among the courts. Among the sources of this confusion are the ways
to interpret the holding in Felker and the principle stated in the Suspension Clause. A practitioner in the circuits which have not interpreted the
restrictions enunciated in AEDPA and IIRIRA, or a Third Circuit practitioner going before the United States Supreme Court, must focus on these
two difficult issues in order to prevail.
First, the practitioner must argue that Felker and prior Supreme Court
precedent requires AEDPA and IIRIRA to be interpreted not to divest district courts of habeas jurisdiction because these statutes are not explicit
enough to overcome the requirement that "habeas jurisdiction can only
be effected by express congressional command." 20 5 Secondly, the practitioner must also argue that, contrary to the assertions of Max-George, the
Suspension Clause's privilege of habeas corpus applies to criminal
aliens.2 0 6 Finally, the practitioner must also note that while Congress may
divest habeas corpus jurisdiction from the district courts, there is no adequate or effective "collateral remedy ... to test the legality of a person's
detention" because of the exclusions of criminal aliens in INA section
242(a) (2) (C). 2 0 7 From these arguments, the practitioner should be able
203. See id. at 322-23 (noting lack of provision granting circuit courts jurisdiction to review substantial constitutional claims). Although INA section 242 (a) (1)
gives the circuit courts jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation, a criminal
alien is excepted from this provision under INA section 242(a) (2) (C). See id. at

322. Furthermore, the court rejected the contention that it has jurisdiction to
review substantial constitutional claims even though they have 'Jurisdiction to de-

termine whether [under INA section 242(a)(2)(C)] each petitioner (1) [is] an
alien, (2) is removable, and (3) is removable by reason of having committed a
qualifying crime." Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Liang court stated that if
this contention were true, "it would create the awkward situation of requiring analysis of the merits of a petitioner's challenge in making a preliminary jurisdictional
determination." Id.
204. Id. at 323. The Liang court then dismissed the appellants petitions without prejudice to the pending habeas corpus petition. See id. (holding claim
dismissed).
205. Cf Liang, 206 F.3d at 317. For a discussion of Felker, see supra notes 62-67
and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of the Suspension Clause, see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
207. See Swain, 430 U.S. at 381.
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to preserve a criminal alien's right to petition for habeas corpus in the
district courts.
Despite the severe limitations that these acts have placed on criminal
aliens, the Third Circuit has firmly established that, under both the transitional and permanent rules, these criminal aliens will be able to partially
challenge final orders of deportation under a petition for habeas
corpus. 20 8 While the Supreme Court is not likely to resolve the split

among the circuits that arose from the transitional rules, due to their transitional nature, the Court most likely will need to resolve the circuit split
resulting from the permanent rules. 20

9

Otherwise, there will be a great

inequity; criminal aliens in jurisdictions such as the Third Circuit will be
able to petition for the great writ of habeas corpus, while criminal aliens in
jurisdictions such as the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits will be deprived of
that privilege.
Matthew J Droskoski

208. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's holdings, see supra notes 118-205
and accompanying text.
209. See Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdictionand the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immi-

gration Act, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1963, 1991 (2000) (noting likelihood of Supreme
Court granting certiorari on issue of permanent rules).
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